Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)
Version: 1.0 · Owner: Pocket PMO Ltd · Approval status: Approved · Review date: annually (or on material change)
1. Purpose and background
Pocket PMO is a project and portfolio management platform used by internal project managers and small PMOs. It processes ordinary business personal data (employee names, contact details, project assignments, meeting notes) and uses AI to summarise, draft, and forecast. Article 35 UK GDPR requires a DPIA where processing is "likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons", including systematic large-scale processing of employee data and use of new technologies (AI). This DPIA has therefore been carried out even though the individual risk profile is moderate.
2. Nature, scope, context and purpose
- Nature. Cloud multi-tenant SaaS. Customer employees are the primary data subjects.
- Scope. Personal data placed in projects, RAID items, meeting notes, uploaded documents, and AI conversation history. Approximately 25–30 personal data attributes per user across the schema (see technical inventory §6).
- Context. Business B2B. Customers are the controllers; Pocket PMO is the processor for content placed inside customer workspaces.
- Purpose. Enable customers to plan, track and report on projects, and to accelerate delivery with human-supervised AI.
3. Data subjects
- Customer end-users (project managers, PMO staff, team members).
- Stakeholders named inside customer projects (may be third parties, e.g. suppliers).
- Marketing leads and support-ticket submitters (controller).
4. Categories of personal data
See the Technical Inventory §6 for the full list. In summary: identity, contact, employment context, project involvement, meeting content, uploaded files, AI conversation history, billing metadata, system telemetry.
No special-category data is intended to be processed. Customers must not upload health, biometric, or other special-category data into the platform (see Acceptable Use Policy).
5. Lawful bases and necessity
Lawful bases are set out in the Privacy Overview. Necessity has been considered against alternatives:
- Could the objective be met with less personal data? Yes for anonymous analytics; no for the core product function.
- Could AI features be delivered without sending prompts to a provider? Not at parity of quality; users can turn AI off per workspace.
6. Proportionality assessment
- The volume and sensitivity of data is proportionate to a business project-management use-case.
- AI features are explicitly advisory. They do not make significant automated decisions.
- The customer controls sharing (Snapshot links, sub-processor invitations, integrations).
7. Specific processing activities considered
7.1 AI processing
Prompts and outputs are transmitted through the Lovable AI Gateway to a model provider (Google Gemini and OpenAI models are available via the gateway). Prompts contain project content the customer has entered, which may include third-party personal data. AI processing is human-approved before it changes project state or communicates externally. Provider no-training and retention statements are held by Pocket PMO on customer request (owner-confirmation D-05).
7.2 Meeting recordings and transcripts
The platform supports transcription via ElevenLabs (elevenlabs-transcribe) and summarisation via the AI Gateway. Audio may be transient depending on customer configuration; transcripts are stored in meetings unless the customer deletes them. Meeting recording can constitute processing of special-category-adjacent data (e.g. voice), so customers must ensure they have a lawful basis and have informed participants.
7.3 Uploaded documents and project content
Files uploaded to the platform are stored in managed object storage with organisation-scoped access. Documents summarised by AI are transmitted to the AI Gateway as part of the prompt.
7.4 External sharing and Snapshot links
Customers can generate share tokens for read-only external distribution (project_share_tokens, drawing_board_share_tokens). Tokens can be revoked; access is auditable. Customers are responsible for judging which content is safe to share.
7.5 Authentication and access
Managed authentication (email/password, Google, Apple, SAML SSO on request), TOTP MFA, session policy 30 minutes idle. Roles evaluated via has_role SECURITY DEFINER function.
7.6 International transfers
Transfers outside the UK/EEA are governed by UK IDTA or EU SCCs per sub-processor. Data residency confirmation is required (H-01, H-02).
7.7 Data retention and deletion
Retention runs while the account is active. Deletion within 30 days of account closure, subject to legal-record requirements and the platform provider's backup retention window.
8. Risk assessment
| # | Risk | Cause | Effect on individuals | Likelihood | Severity | Existing mitigation | Residual | Further action | Owner | Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Unauthorised access to another organisation's data | RLS misconfiguration on a new table | Confidentiality breach | Low | High | RLS enabled on every business table; GRANT statements enforced per migration; security scan runs in CI; hardened has_role function; RLS regression tests. | Low | Add automated RLS tests to CI covering all new tables. | Engineering | Q3 26 |
| R2 | Model provider retains prompts and trains on customer content | Provider policy change | Confidentiality breach; reputational | Low | High | Approval-first UI; prompts scoped to project context; provider attestations retained. | Low-Med | Annual re-attestation from every model provider (D-05). | Legal | Q4 26 |
| R3 | Meeting audio retained longer than necessary | Product default | Confidentiality of participants | Med | Med | Transcripts are user-managed and deletable. | Med | Set audio retention default and publish (D-03). | Product | Q3 26 |
| R4 | Snapshot link over-shares | User error | Confidentiality of stakeholders | Med | Med | Tokens are revocable; access is auditable; token scope is narrow. | Med | Add reminder banner + optional expiry on share creation. | Product | Q3 26 |
| R5 | Credentials phishing | External attacker | Account compromise | Med | High | HIBP password check; MFA supported; rate limits; session timeout; anomaly logging in security_events. | Low-Med | Consider mandatory admin MFA (S-08). | Engineering | Q3 26 |
| R6 | Loss of database availability | Provider outage | Availability | Low | High | Managed platform daily backups (H-03); PWA offline mode with mutation queue for continuity of writes. | Med | Confirm RTO/RPO and publish. Annual restore test (A-05). | Ops | Q4 26 |
| R7 | Sub-processor exposure via new integration | New feature added | Confidentiality | Med | Med | Sub-Processor Register maintained; announcement obligation in DPA. | Med | Add pre-release checklist ensuring new processors are declared before ship. | Legal + Product | Ongoing |
| R8 | Right-to-erasure not completed in time | Manual workflow gap | Rights infringement | Low | Med | Self-serve at /data-privacy; data_deletion_requests table; audit trail. | Low | Publish 30-day SLA (C-4). | Legal | Q3 26 |
| R9 | Personal data placed in public forms accessible via share tokens | Misconfiguration | Confidentiality of stakeholders | Low | Med | Public form endpoints separated from authenticated data; rate-limited; captcha recommendation. | Low-Med | Ship captcha on anonymous public embeds (A-3). | Product | Q3 26 |
| R10 | AI hallucinated content misused | Human error | Reputational (individuals mis-quoted) | Med | Low-Med | [DRAFT] labels; approval-first UI; user-controlled model switch off. | Low-Med | Continue emphasising human-in-the-loop UX. | Product | Ongoing |
| R11 | Push-notification vendor exposure | External integration | Availability, confidentiality | Low | Low | Notification content is minimal (title + link). | Low | Confirm vendor identity (H-06 adjacent). | Product | Q4 26 |
| R12 | Stripe / billing metadata leakage | Provider breach | Confidentiality of billing | Low | Med | Stripe is the controller of card data; only customer/subscription identifiers are stored locally. | Low | Verify Stripe security posture annually. | Legal | Annual |
9. Existing controls (cross-reference)
- Row Level Security on every table + GRANT-per-migration invariant.
has_roleSECURITY DEFINER function.- MFA (TOTP) via
MFAGate. - Session timeout + inactivity warning (
useSessionTimeout). - HIBP password check + strength policy.
- Rate limits + failed-login logging.
- Approval-first AI UI.
- Audit logs (
audit_logs, per-domain change tables). - Encrypted transport (TLS 1.3) and at-rest storage (AES-256).
- Sentry error monitoring (when enabled).
10. Residual risk
Following existing controls, the residual risk is assessed as Low-to-Medium across all identified processing activities. Highest residual risks are R2, R3 and R6, all addressable via governance work rather than architectural change.
11. Consultation
This DPIA was drafted internally. Where residual risk is Medium or higher, consultation with an external adviser (privacy counsel) is recommended before public launch.
12. Review and approval
| Reviewer | Role | Decision | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Owner-confirmation required | Data Controller | Draft | 13 Jul 26 |
| Owner-confirmation required | Legal | Draft | — |
Owner confirmation required
- L-03 privacy lead; H-01 region; H-02 AI region; H-03 backup; A-02/A-03 RTO/RPO; D-03 meeting-recording retention; D-05 model no-training statements (confirmed 15 Jul 26).
Document history
| Version | Date | Change | Author |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 13 Jul 26 | Initial DPIA. | Pocket PMO |
